<a href="http://educationinthestreets.blogspot.com">Education In The Streets</a>

Monday, March 08, 2004

The LA Weekly on "The National Failure of the Grocery Workers' Union"

The three chains’ coast-to-coast presence gave them the financial power to weather hard economic times, or strikes, in one part of the country as long as shoppers were still rolling their carts through checkout lanes in other regions. UFCW, though, remained fractured, promoting local and separate control while other unions were coming to terms with the need to centralize finances, strategy and organizing. New labor vigor crystallized around the Service Employees International Union, which promoted energetic organizing, scrupulous planning and carefully targeted work actions. The SEIU culture became the new standard in the 1990s, when its leader, former janitor John Sweeney, became head of the AFL-CIO. Among Sweeney’s opponents was Doug Dority.

The drawbacks of Dority’s approach became apparent as seven Southern California leaders squabbled over strategy, failed to acknowledge the corporate willingness to forgo short-term profits, and stumbled over outreach to other unions that stood ready with resources and good will.

Among the biggest gaffes and setbacks: The union failed to present a clear message to the public, shoppers and even its own members. In the early days of the strike, picketers outside the Albertsons at the Baldwin-Crenshaw plaza urged shoppers to get their groceries at, of all places, the nearby nonunion Wal-Mart. The union misplayed strong public support of the strike by lifting pickets at all Ralphs stores, thinking the move would put pressure on Safeway, when in fact the three chains were sharing profits. Having removed the pickets, some leaders invited shoppers to return to Ralphs while others asked them to stay away. In the words of one UFCW representative, “We don’t want them to shop there, but they have to do what they have to do.”

Outreach to the crucial Teamsters union was spotty. Early pickets were sent to grocery-distribution warehouses, but the Teamsters crossed freely. Later, just before Thanksgiving, the Teamsters agreed not to cross the lines — but they returned to work a month later after the UFCW gave them the okay.

Leaders realized things were going poorly and called in the AFL-CIO in December to take over strategy, but failed to follow up. They forgot to give special consideration to their more than 800 supermarket pharmacists and may lose them to another union. They got extraordinary support from dockworkers, janitors and entertainment unions, but they failed to take full advantage of that support or of a smattering of sympathy strikes in Washington, D.C.

The day before the settlement was reached, the hotel and restaurant workers (known as HERE) and the clothing, textiles and laundry union (UNITE) announced a strategic merger that will allow them to employ some of the tactics that have made SEIU successful — like lining up contract expiration dates and presenting management with the prospect of a nationwide action. That’s something UFCW was not equipped to do this time around. But in the future it may have to go that way.

“UFCW has to critically evaluate what happened here,” said Kent Wong, director of the Center for Labor Research and Education at UCLA. “It speaks to a broader need for labor solidarity.”

¶ 10:36 PM

Smash Yale-[ comments.]

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